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Abstract
The medieval systems of law in Italy and Europe 
have been proposed as a sort of virtual laboratory 
to deal with the issue of ensuring that the principle 
of equality in the rule of law be compatible with 
the recognition of indigenous peoples’ customs.
The legal framework of the medieval com-
munes sought to strike a balance between the 
general interest in having legal certainty and uni-
formity with the citizens’ interest in ruling their 
family life and economic assets according to their 
cultural and social values.
Up until the 14th century, in Lombardy an 
individual’s legal status, family and inheritance 
continued to be ruled according to the customs 
of the individual’s natio, be they Lombard or Ro-
man.
The ascertainment of customs is an arduous 
task, as oral customs are ﬂuid and vary from place 
to place and from family to family. For this reason, 
in the Middle Ages ascertainment was always en-
trusted to judges and legal experts (sapientes).
Until a few decades ago, recognising and en-
forcing customs was mostly unthinkable due to 
legal positivism and the principle of equality. Now, 
however, the limits of the principle of legal equal-
ity are well known: »Legal positivism was not able 
to abolish status« (G. Alpa). 
The recognition of »legal Indigenous status« 
provides continuity between the past (the Middle 
Ages) and present (Indigenous Peoples Basic Law). 
Just as in the past, when living according to a given 
natio’s laws and customs did not mean self-govern-
ment, so today the enforcement of an indigenous 
peoples’ basic law should not undermine the sov-
ereignty of the State.
□×
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1 Recognising customs without granting self-
government from past to present
One of the goals of this Focus is to consider how 
to pave the way for eﬀective application of in-
digenous customs in courts. In fact, in endeavour-
ing to respect human rights, the Republic of China 
is actively dealing with the very complex problem 
of recognising the cultural and customary legal 
traditions of indigenous peoples in compliance 
with the International Covenant on Civil and Polit-
ical Rights.1
According to articles 1, 23 and 30 of the Indig-
enous Peoples Basic Law of 5 February 2005, the 
legal customs of indigenous and / or tribal peoples 
are to be recognised and respected in »judicial and 
administration remedial procedures, mediation, 
arbitration and the like«, with respect to traditional 
and customary rules related to the social, economic 
and political institutions in their territories, as well 
as within the Traditional Territories and Reserved 
Land.2
The Republic of China is not willing to allow 
indigenous peoples any form of self-government.3
However, this approach represents a reversal of the 
trend that swept across Europe from the beginning 
of the 19th century, which led to both the central-
isation and the codiﬁcation of a unique State law in 
the name of equality, an equality that was actually 
ﬁctitious, as it was not supported by an eﬀective, 
de facto equality, with severe outcomes for the 
working class as well as for the indigenous peoples 
subject to European colonial powers throughout 
the world.4
The medieval Italian and European systems of 
the law have been very correctly proposed as a sort 
of virtual laboratory in which one can observe the 
exact opposite of the 19th century European mo-
del. In Middle Ages, citizenship and subjection to a 
kingdom did not prevent individuals from claim-
ing to rule their legal aﬀairs according to the 
customs or laws of their natio. Such circumstances 
were the outcome of a long series of historical 
events that began in the early Middle Ages.
Historical research shows just how controversial 
the meaning of the term natio is. What historians 
know is that the original ethnic characteristics and 
identity of barbarian peoples (gentes) that invaded 
the Roman Empire progressively faded or at least 
underwent continuous change due to the assim-
ilation process among barbarian peoples (gentes) 
and Romans. Thorough studies have been carried 
out on the »ethnogenesis of the barbarian within 
the Empire«,5 as well as the subsequent establish-
1 United Nations, International cove-
nant on civil and political rights, 
art. 40.
2 Indigenous Peoples Basic Law (2005): 
Art. 1 »This Law is hereby promul-
gated for the expressed purposes of 
recognizing, protecting, and pro-
moting the fundamental rights of 
Indigenous People, enhance and se-
cure shared prosperity of the Indige-
nous communities, so as to ensure 
Indigenous Peoples’ continued sur-
vival based on sustainable socio-eco-
nomic development and in the spirit 
of inter-people cooperation«. Art. 23 
»The Government shall recognize and 
respect Indigenous Peoples’ rights 
to choose their way of life, customs, 
clothing, modes of social and economic 
institutions, methods of resource utiliza-
tion and types of land ownership and 
management, based on their Indige-
nous knowledge systems and practices
(IKSPs)«. Art. 30 »The Government 
shall give due respect to tribal lan-
guages, Indigenous customs and practic-
es, cultural diversity, cultural integ-
rity, and the integrity of the values, 
practices and institutions of Indige-
nous Peoples in the process of dealing 
with Indigenous aﬀairs, making laws 
or implementing judicial and ad-
ministration remedial procedures, 
notarization, mediation, arbitration 
and the like, for the purpose of pro-
tecting the lawful rights of Indige-
nous Peoples. In the event that an 
Indigenous Person does not under-
stand the Chinese language, an inter-
preter who speaks the tribal language 
shall be put in place. Indigenous 
Peoples’ courts and / or tribunals may 
be established for the purpose of 
protecting Indigenous Peoples’ rights 
and equitable access to Justice / the 
judicial system / the judiciary system«. 
(The italics are mine).
3 Implementation of the International 
Covenant (2012) 2.
4 N (2009); N (2012).
5 G (2003) 99–150; P (1998), 
(2000) 17–69.
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ment of the Kingdoms of Burgunds, Visigoths, 
Francs and Lombards in the territory of the Roman 
Empire between the 5th and 7th centuries.
In any case, the political nature of the king-
dom’s establishment did not eliminate the ethnic 
consciousness of the predominant people making 
up the kingdom, as was the case with the Lom-
bards in Italy;6 it was only a ‘new’ identity, so to 
speak.7
As described below, medieval Lombard records 
show how claiming the application of the laws of 
the natio (Lombard or Roman) was an attempt by 
individuals to apply a speciﬁc set of rules to their 
legal aﬀairs.
From this point of view, it could be argued that, 
in medieval law, a twofold status (or legal person-
ality) coexisted within each person: that of one’s 
natio (e.g. Roman or Lombard), and that of a citi-
zen or subject to the king. There was even a three-
fold status in some cases: a ‘national’ status (e.g. 
Roman or Lombard), the status of being a citizen 
and the status of being a subject to the king.
In early medieval Europe, multiple sets of rules 
on the status of subjects in the same legal system 
could apply simultaneously when custom was a 
source of law and the principle of equality was still 
unsettled, which was made easier by the fact that 
the modern concepts of State law did not yet exist. 
The status of the individual, without distinction 
between legal capacity and capacity to act, was 
determined by the bundle of customs or laws that 
ruled his or her life according to the people, gens or 
natio to which he or she belonged. Determining 
the law applicable to a speciﬁc case was a matter of 
the »internal« rules on conﬂict of laws, and these 
rules, which were developed by jurists and applied 
in courts, were oen common to several jurisdic-
tions.
While living according to the law of one’s origin 
was consubstantial with one’s status, I maintain 
that the recognition and enforcement of personal 
laws did not lessen the authority of State law, nor 
did it create forms of autonomy that might weaken 
the sovereignty of States.
On the contrary, by respecting pluralism in 
speciﬁc categories of cases that did not aﬀect public 
order / policy, the State was able to enhance inte-
gration and consensus. Indeed, there seemed to be 
a belief that such integration would translate into 
obedience and respect for fundamental traditional 
legal values, such as those concerning personal 
legal capacity, marriage, family, property, owner-
ship, contract and inheritance law. It simply de-
pended, then as now, on the minorities’ propensity 
to seek contact and interaction, or in contrast, to 
isolate themselves or advocate separatism.
Legal pluralism was the main characteristic of 
the legal order.
In the eyes of a European legal historian, when 
considering medieval legal categories, the only way 
to deal with such matters as the granting of 
fundamental rights to indigenous peoples without 
granting them self-governance is to appeal to the 
theory of statutes and the distinction between 
personal and real statutes. The former are rules 
applicable to individuals in accordance with their 
people and / or their familial traditions, while the 
latter are rules applicable to land.8
Though it may seem paradoxical, there is indeed 
a speciﬁc term in the above-mentioned »Basic 
Law« that suggests and allows for a closer connec-
tion to be established between Taiwanese law in the 
21st century and European law in the Middle Ages, 
or at least provides the possibility of a common 
ground of reasoning. That term is »status«, in ref-
erence to both individuals and land.9
6 For bibliographical references, see al-
so: P-S (2011) 71–72. 
During their occupation of Italy, the 
Lombards were helped by Saxons, 
Gepids, Bulgarians, Sarmatians, Pan-
nonians, Swabians and Noricons. As a 
consequence of their military sup-
port, these people were then allowed, 
under the king’s protection, to settle 
wherever they wanted within the 
conquered Italian territory, but at the 
time of Rothari’s edict in 643 which 
was drawn up according to the style 
of his gens – secundum ritum gentis 
nostrae, these peoples, with the ex-
ception of the Saxons, accepted the 
Lombard rules (J (2003), 
416–427): »The rex gentis Langobar-
dorum was, therefore, acclaimed by 
his gens as their ruler and leader, and 
in this position was of rank fully 
equal to that of the other reges, 
whether they ruled over the Herules, 
the Gepids, the Goths or the Franks. 
As rex Langobardorum he was the 
central focal point of his gens and the 
embodiment of his tribal conscious-
ness«.
7 G (2003) 71–78.
8 See bibliographical references about 
the theory of statutes in S 
S (1989) 1–66.
9 Indigenous Peoples Basic Law art. 2: 
»The term ›Indigenous Persons‹ 
means nationals who are registered 
either as Mountain Region Indige-
nous Peoples or as Plain Region In-
digenous Peoples, and thereby obtain 
legal Indigenous status, being evi-
denced by the household registration 
records of aforesaid Indigenous Per-
sons.« (The italics are mine.)
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The term status shis legal reasoning from the 
category of rights to that of the intrinsic nature of a 
person or thing. In this sense, as far as individuals 
are concerned, their customary way of acting is 
consubstantial with their personal status, in addi-
tion to indicating some speciﬁc legal elements of 
their capacity.
In light of these preliminary considerations, I 
will pursue two distinct lines of reasoning, as they 
refer to two diﬀerent sets of categories or questions 
from a juridical point of view. The ﬁrst line of 
reasoning concerns deﬁning the validity of law, as 
well as the distinction between the laws of the 
nation (gens – natio) to which a person belongs by 
birth (family, tribe, people) and the laws that apply 
within the territory where the person resides. The 
other line of reasoning relates to the technical 
problem of identifying customary law and to the 
process of writing down customs. From this point 
of view, judges have played a fundamental role 
because the recognition of customary laws could 
increase the number of claims and result in the 
juridiﬁcation of social and legal issues.10 This 
phenomenon might have informed art. 30 of the 
Indigenous Peoples Basic Law, which states that 
the due respect of indigenous customs and practic-
es requires »implementing judicial and adminis-
tration remedial procedures, notarization, media-
tion, arbitration and the like« and subsequently 
setting up specialised chambers and sections in the 
justice system to handle cases involving an indige-
nous party.11
The judiciary might have a fundamental role in 
carrying out this task. Settling controversies based 
on customs and traditions requires that judges 
ascertain the content and proper understanding 
of indigenous peoples’ customary rules as they 
emerge from particular cases. Needless to say, 
however expert and legally experienced judges 
may be, they might have great diﬃculty in recog-
nising the religious and ethical values underlying 
ethnic customs.
Going back to the 6th century, a famous text 
held that the conscience and expertise of the judge 
were the rectum tramite to reconcile and bring 
together general law with personal law: »omnis 
populus ibi commanentes, tam Franci, Romani, Bur-
gundionis vel reliquas nationis sub tuo regimine et 
gubernatione degant et moderentur, et eos, recto tra-
mite, secundum lege et consuetudine eorum regas«.12
In other words, all peoples residing in the State, 
Franks, Romans, Burgundians as well as every natio
subjected to your government, live in peace. You 
have to rule them by means of justice – which I 
suspect was a way of saying by means of equity – 
while keeping the balance between the general law 
and their customs.
2 Pluralism in the medieval communes and 
kingdoms
Quale lege vivis? What is your law?13
In the early medieval period this was the ﬁrst 
question that defendants had to answer when they 
were sued in courts.
Much legislation shows that respect for ethnic 
law is the basic, original feature of the German 
legal conception,14 a conception that some early 
medieval kingdoms inherited. In actuality, the Ro-
mans also recognised the right of some peoples 
who were annexed by the empire (foederati15) to 
live according to their own law.
Obviously, ethnic and customary law concerned 
not only private relationships; public law and the 
body of principles underpinning the diﬀerent 
forms of government were profoundly inﬂuenced 
as well.
Historians have thoroughly studied this way of 
recognising and enforcing personal law in the early 
Middle Ages. Still, studying the Lombard King-
dom can help to explain some features of subse-
quent judicial practice in the communal cities and 
kingdoms, ﬁrst the Normans and later the King-
10 D (2001) 5.
11 See fn. 1 above.
12 Marculﬁ Formularum liber I, 8 Carta 
de ducatu, patriciato et comitatu, 
MGH, Legum s. V, 48.
13 See, for example: Chartularium, in: 
M.G.H. Leges IV, 600: Qualiter charta 
ostendatur: »Domne comes, propter hoc 
ostendit Petrus hanc cartam venditionis 
[...] Qua lege vivis? Longobarda. [....] 
Similiter est in Romana. In Salicha dic: 
obliga te, et ›warpi te‹ et ›proheredes‹ et 
›insuper‹.«; S (2011) 418–428.
14 C (1995) 51–172; P-
S (2009) 38–48.
15 D. 49,15,7.
Fokus focus
Claudia Storti 259
doms of Sicily and France. Indeed, between the 
12th and 15th centuries, jurists and judges contin-
ued to recognise personal law despite the strong 
increase in integration between individuals and 
families of Roman and Lombard law. As time 
passed, the diﬀerences between the two peoples, 
Lombard and Roman, faded and general customs 
became ever more widespread.16
As the preambles of the Lombard kings’ laws 
demonstrate, the certainty of customary rules was 
an essential instrument to maintain and protect 
social order. This was even more important in the 
peripheral or remote, mountainous areas of the 
kingdom, where public oﬃcials and judges were 
few, or less skilled, less learned or less authoritative. 
In such areas, public outrage, rebellions and upris-
ings broke out more readily. As provided by Liutp. 
42 and Ratc. 10, the king was sometimes inclined 
to justify protests, and not to punish them, on the 
grounds that oﬃcials and / or judges and courts 
were responsible for denials and / or miscarriages 
of justice, or for the infringement of customary 
rules. Indeed, orders or judgments issued by public 
oﬃcials that were deemed contrary to some cus-
toms or unsuitable for the common understanding 
and experience of local society were the increas-
ingly frequent pretext of such revolts. It was not 
infrequent that the king’s curia launched an in-
quiry in response to this kind of disorder, or on the 
speciﬁc request of oﬃcials, judges or dukes. The 
end of the inquiry might consist in recognising the 
proper content of a speciﬁc custom that was 
written down in a king’s rule (edictum).17
Disputes and inquiries could also arise with 
regard to lands and estates. Distinguishing the 
king’s demesne from freehold property and from 
the collective ownership of a community was not 
always easy. On the contrary, the process of deﬁn-
itively establishing who had rights (the king, a 
private individual, a community) to work a piece 
of land and exploit its resources was a problem of 
public order, even leaving aside that the wealth of 
the State consisted in land and land revenue. The 
judges ascertained rights over the land by cross-
examination.18
The Carolingian Empire did not do away with 
the laws of the conquered kingdoms. In particular, 
the edicta of the Lombard Kingdom were not 
abolished, but only modiﬁed in some cases. Be-
tween 783 and 802, the provisions of Charles the 
Great’s capitularia stipulated that his oﬃcials (missi 
et comites) were to conduct inquiries to ascertain 
the laws of the peoples living in his new territories. 
Each individual was to be asked what the binding 
rules of his or her people were »per singulos inquir-
ant quale habeant legem ex natione«.19 Charles the 
Bold adopted the same policy with the peoples 
living in the Kingdom of the West Franks.20
I have examined the ancient Lombard and 
Carolingian Empires to point out how, despite 
extraordinary political, cultural, economic and 
social changes, the ancient system of legal thinking 
about national laws still exercised a very strong 
inﬂuence over learned lawyers, judges and indeed 
over the entire European legal system until the late 
Middle Ages.
However, there was a shi in the meaning of the 
expression »national law«. It originally indicated 
the law of a people, but as time passed, it came to 
mean personal law; that is, the law according to 
which a person lived because of his or her origins. 
As is evident in documents and judicial formulae
(formal statements), individuals formally asserted 
their legal personality by declaring to live as Lom-
16 P-R (1998) 205–219; G
(2003) 120–127 and with regard to 
the famous Liutprand’s edictum de 
scribis: P-S (2009) 49; 
C (1995) 230–236.
17 S (2015) 461–462 with refer-
ence to Liutp. 42, a. 723, and Ratc. 10. 
P-S (1966) 158–161.
18 S (2015) 462–472.
19 S (2011) 425–426 with refer-
ence to Capitulare missorum, 792 
(Capitulare regum Francorum, t. I, 
Kar. M. 25). See also: Carolus Mag-
nus, 143 = Leges Lanogobarodum, II, 
56: Qualiter diversarum legum homines 
res suas diﬃnire debent. 1: Sicut con-
suetudo nostroest ut Longobardus aut 
Romanus (si evenerit quod causam inter 
se habeant) observamus ut Romani suc-
cessiones iuxta illorum legem habeant; 
similiter et omnes scriptiones secundum 
legem suam faciant; et quando iurant, 
iuxta legem suam iurent; et quando 
componuntur iuxta legem ipsius cuius 
malum fecerint, componantur; et Lon-
gobardos illos convenit similiter compo-
nere; de ceteris vero causis communi lege 
vivamus; Leges longobardorum II, 56, 
2 (= Pipinus 27): De diversis genera-
tionibus hominum; and Leges Lon-
gobardorum II, 57, 1 (= Loth. 38): Ut 
interrogetur populus romanus qua lege 
vult vivere.
20 S (2011) 428–429.
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bards or as Romans based on the nation to which 
they belonged (in Latin: »ex natione mea professus 
sum lege vivere …«).
Further testament to the continuity of this habit 
in the Regnum of the Lombards (or of Italy) in the 
11th century can be found in collections of docu-
mentary formulae, in particular the cartularium 
Regnum Italiae, a French text readapted to Italian 
praxis,21 as well as in the reports and case-material 
written down in the Expositio ad librum papiensem, 
and the formulae adopted in judicial proceedings 
before tribunals and courts.
Later, in the self-governing communes as well as 
in the communes under the control of a kingdom, 
personal or local customary rules, which were 
sometimes written down, and statutes could coex-
ist together with the general law of the kingdom. 
Examples include Frederick II’s Liber Constitutio-
num Regni Siciliae of 1231, Philip the Fair’s Ordon-
nance of 1312 as well as the French Midi, Southern 
Italy and the cities of Sicily.
The plurality of sources in medieval legal sys-
tems and the compulsory nature of customs were 
not at stake, nor was the city’s and / or kingdom’s 
unity.22
Although a commune’s citizens were subject to 
its statute or local customs for the speciﬁc catego-
ries of cases ruled by general law (usually penal 
law, procedural rules and so on), some citizens 
continued to live according to the law of their 
ancestry or family for other kinds of cases, regard-
less of whether it was an independent civitas sibi 
princeps, a commune subjected to a republican or 
seigneurial State or to a principality.
Carolus de Tocco was a lawyer, jurist and pro-
fessor at the Universities of Piacenza in Lombardy, 
near Pavia and Milan, and Benevento in Campa-
nia, near Naples.23 As he wrote in the 13th century, 
diﬀerent obligations could be binding for Romans 
and Lombards as far as contract and penal law were 
concerned. In contractual obligations, there was 
indeed a distinction between Romans and Lom-
bards living in the same city or kingdom when it 
came to accountability. Roman contract law ac-
tually provided speciﬁc elements of formality, 
which were necessary for the contract to be valid. 
In contrast, no such formalities prevailed under 
Lombard contract law. Even an informal agree-
ment (pactus nudus) resulted in obligation, became 
enforceable and produced legal eﬀects.24 Conse-
quently, Romans were immune to legal action in 
cases of informal agreements, but a Lombard could 
be sued as a result of this kind of stipulation.
In the late medieval period, the legal enforce-
ability of informal agreements, originally only a 
Lombard institution, became part of European 
civil law in general, thanks to the jurisprudence 
of canon law.25
3 Writing down customary rules
There were also measures to avoid abuse of 
judicial discretion and arbitrary judgments and 
sentences in the Lombard Kingdom and the city 
communes.
As a general rule, oral customary rules were 
enforceable in the legal system throughout the 
Middle Ages without formal recognition on the 
part of lawmakers. Lawmakers did not provide a 
unifying framework for oral customary rules. The 
territorial extent of the applicability of customs 
depended on the relative preponderance of the 
groups or even the families, which naturally varied 
both over time and in kingdoms, cities and rural 
regions. As a result, the impact of customary law 
on the legal system of each region, as well as the 
interaction between general or oﬃcial law and 
customary law, strongly depended on the context 
and the historical period.
Generally speaking, ascertaining customary 
rules in the Middle Ages was a bottom-up process. 
Specialists, including lawyers and judges, induced 
a general rule from speciﬁc cases and from the 
evidence and statements provided by common 
people. Legal rules were then promulgated by 
kings, or later, in the communal cities, by com-
mune assemblies.
21 Cartularium, in M.G.H., Leges, IV, 
595–601, and on the examination of 
personal law and the formalities nec-
essary for a given act to be legally valid 
in the eyes of a given law: 17 Qualiter 
carta ostendatur, p. 600. There was a 
striking diﬀerence among the for-
malities required for the enforcement 
of ostensio chartae, an institution that 
had recently been created as a result of 
contractual and judicial practice. 
C (1995) 163, nt. 95.
22 G (2007) 37–64.
23 C (2013).
24 C  T (1537), Gl. Sicut 
cui malum a Lombarda Lib. II, LVI 
(sec. XIII); S (2011) 429–432.
25 P-S (2008) 111–112.
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Writing down customary rules in oﬃcial texts 
during the early medieval period was conceived as 
a safeguard for public order, even though, as 
Liutprand asserted, some customary rules had 
bound courts and been applied by judges for 
decades or even centuries without having been 
written down by his time. By no means did the 
king’s approval and the recording of customs by 
public oﬃcials or chancery constitute a require-
ment or precondition for their enforceability: 
»quia tantumodo causa ipsa in hoc modo semper et 
antecessorum nostrorum tempore et nostro per cawar-
ﬁda sic iudicatam est; nam in edicto scripta non 
fuit«.26
In case of uncertainty about the rules applicable 
in a case, the judge or the court summoned the 
citizens or rural peoples, the laity and the ecclesi-
astics, to give evidence of their knowledge and 
perception concerning the content of controversial 
customary rules and their application.
In 726, for example, a dispute broke out in the 
king’s court because some judges had used their 
discretion to resolve, arbitrarily (per arbitrium), a 
particular case that would have traditionally been 
ruled by oral custom. The judgement delivered was 
contrary to, or at least diﬀerent from, those that 
had been previously issued according to the cus-
tomary understanding and interpretation of that 
same custom. At this point, Liutprand ordered that 
the customary oral rule be transformed into a 
written law, which was then to be made known 
to all subjects (omnibus manifesta). He was sure that 
the only way to prevent future contrasting judg-
ments would be to write the rule down, and 
thereby clarify and certify its terms and content.
Regardless of the reason a customary rule was to 
be recognised and written into a general law, the 
ascertainment of its content and spirit was to be 
done by subtile inquisitionem. Great diﬃculties 
could arise in »translating« Lombard institutions 
and procedures into Latin – and therefore Roman 
– words and legal conceptual frameworks.
As is reported in some trial minutes, the ex-
pression »subtile inquisitionem« indicated not only 
formal or informal inquiries made by judges and 
oﬃcials, but also a formal procedure in the king’s 
court. In the Lombard Kingdom, as in the Mer-
ovingian dynasty, the Carolingian Empire, the 
Lombard Italiae Regnum and the Norman duchy 
of southern Italy, the members of the King’s court 
were both legal experts, such as judges, lawyers, 
public oﬃcials, wise and learned laymen or reli-
gious men, who were all chosen as »analysts« of the 
society.
These judges and faithful experts convened 
from all over the kingdom and met in special 
committees. They then reported the main results 
of their discussions to the king, including any 
dissenting opinions, and debated with him until 
a unanimous solution was reached. The solution 
was issued in a general assembly, and at the end a 
report of the proceedings was composed. Thus, 
both society and legal culture contributed to mak-
ing the law more and more certain.
Communal cities adopted similar procedures 
when they had to ascertain and record their cus-
toms. The constitutum usus of Pisa in Tuscany, issued 
in 1160, is one of the oldest and most complete 
texts of recorded customs in a communal statute. 
The proceedings held to compile the text are 
summarised in its introduction. Between 1155 
and 1160, the commune assembly elected ﬁve 
committees of legal experts (Sapientes) to examine 
unwritten customs that were commonly applied in 
the city tribunals and courts, although these rules 
originated from relationships between the Pisani
and foreigners or merchants from various coun-
tries around the world. The aim was to guarantee 
that the common, still unwritten rules and stipu-
lations were uniformly applied to analogous cases 
no matter the level of culture, awareness of cases or 
knowledge and understanding of the rules the 
judges might have.
The committees’ task was very hard. They had to 
discern and distinguish customary rules from Ro-
man and Lombard law and produce an exact 
ascertainment of what those customary rules pre-
scribed. As in the ancient Lombard Kingdom, at 
the conclusion of this formidable work, the city 
assembly approved the ﬁnal text, ratiﬁed it and 
made it eﬀectively applicable in contracts, deeds 
and, of course, in tribunals and courts.27
The Pisan experience in writing down customs 
eventually came to be seen as the archetype for the 
26 S (2015) 452, with reference to 
Liutp. 133 (MGH, Legum t. IV, 165).
27 V (2003) 129–130.
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medieval legal system in the communes of that 
time.
Another procedure was established alongside 
the one mentioned above that was passed down 
until the modern era. Developed by the glossators, 
it was a judicial procedure stating that a custom 
could be considered ascertained and in force if it 
had been the ratio decidendi of two similar cases.
4 Conclusions
Having taken a »provocative« look at the past, so 
to speak, it is now time for some concluding 
remarks on the present.
Until a few decades ago, there would have been 
no point in reviving the memory of Europe’s 
historical experience. It has recently been recog-
nised, however, that extraordinary errors were 
committed by »civilized« European countries dur-
ing colonialism, not to mention the more recent 
injustices committed by dictatorships all over the 
world. These tragedies have led to a search for 
renewed dignity of those who have had their 
cultural and societal traditions trampled upon. As 
a consequence, it has become necessary to restitute 
in the name of protecting human rights, by recog-
nizing diﬀerences and by taking the opportunity to 
create a new legal system that safeguards such 
diﬀerences.
Aer all, even »Western« countries continue to 
deal with the eﬀects and complications of diﬀerent 
legal statuses based on socio-economic class, reli-
gion, race or gender, despite formal declarations of 
egalitarianism and the notion that everyone is 
equal before the law. »Legal positivism was not 
able to abolish statuses. Nor was the ever-present 
yet unattainable model of natural law able to 
achieve better results. On the contrary, it was 
strongly contested«.28 In Europe and the Western 
world in general, the use of status as a way to 
diﬀerentiate between persons before the law con-
tinues to have signiﬁcant repercussions within and 
beyond the realm of law.29
Further, recent decades have witnessed deep 
thinking on State-centrism and the potential coex-
istence of State law with non-state legal orders, 
despite the fact that this might jeopardise those 
principles of equality that modern democracies 
have fought so hard to promote but have not yet 
fully achieved.30 Clearly, the social, economic, 
political and cultural aspects of this age of global-
isation are completely diﬀerent than those that 
existed in the medieval and modern eras. Prom-
inent scholars, such as Twining, have recently 
considered State legal pluralism as »not unimpor-
tant or uninteresting«.31
Thus, from a purely theoretical point of view, 
there may not be anything keeping a plurality of 
customs from being recognised within a sovereign 
State. This is especially true for the regulation of 
personal status, but also in terms of rules on the 
ownership and utilisation of land, as is the case 
with the Indigenous Peoples Basic Law.32
From a practical point of view, however, it may 
not be so easy to resurrect a compressed and 
debased form of customary law – or rather, a plu-
rality of customary laws – and apply it to modern 
times. Moreover, the doctrine of desuetude, which 
was well known in the legal culture of the Middle 
Ages, may have resulted in the disappearance of 
many local or indigenous customs, for better or for 
worse. Whether it was brought on by force or 
happened on its own, a large part of indigenous 
heritage could be lost. As evidenced by the com-
plex and unsuccessful work of anthropologists in 
Taiwan, it can be very diﬃcult to ascertain the 
content and spirit of the customs of the sixteen 
indigenous peoples living in Taiwan. Notwith-
standing the democratic constitution, Chiang 
Kai-shek’s lasting authoritarian power undoubt-
edly led to social, cultural and economic changes, 
to the point that the memory and meaning of 
customs might have faded, if not been lost entirely.
It should also be said, perhaps superﬂuously, 
that customary sources are unstable and continu-
ously evolving. They are passed on in the tradi-
tional language and through traditional acts, and 
they are based on particular religious beliefs, forms 
of society and social and economic relationships. 
Thus, with the passage of time, several customs 
might lose their roots. It might now be impossible 
28 I only mention this as a highly au-
thoritative source: A (1993) 
175–178.
29 A (1993) 24–25, 38–41.
30 T (2010) 500–502.
31 T (2010) 490–493, 496.
32 See nt. 1 above, Indigenous Peoples 
Basic Law, art. 23.
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to identify and ascertain them, as their foundation 
and reasons for being are lost. Nonetheless, if 
something is ascertainable, and not contrary to 
the general principles of a democratic State, it 
could be recovered.
Due to delays in the implementation of the 
human rights principles established by the UN, 
much has certainly been lost. Those same delays 
may also explain why it has been so hard to recover 
and ascertain customs, despite the fact that this 
work is founded on principles and conducted 
scientiﬁcally. Many customs may have been lost 
in the meantime or may have changed. Whatever 
the case may be, there may not be any reason for 
them to exist anymore in an economic and social 
context that is completely diﬀerent from when the 
customs were formed and observed.
Allowing the indigenous peoples to live accord-
ing to their own customs means moving past the 
principle of equality among citizens and granting 
recognition of inequalities, but it does not mean 
challenging the national sovereignty of the Repub-
lic of China. Indeed, recognising indigenous cus-
toms in State-approved matters would fall exclu-
sively within the realm of conﬂict of laws within 
the State. Therefore, the process of identifying 
when these customs can be applied to speciﬁc cases 
would be entrusted to the State’s internal rules of 
private international law.
n
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